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We trace the development of numeracy in Poland and Russia from the early 17
th century 
onwards, and numeracy in Belarus, Ukraine, and Lithuania from the 18
th century 
onwards. The fact that western Poland was doing relatively well during the 16
th and early 
17




th, and early 19
th centuries, and even fell back relative to Southern Europe during this 
period, might support the hypothesis that the second serfdom development was one of the 
core factors delaying Eastern European human capital accumulation. The major wars in 
the region also had a devastating effect on numeracy levels. 
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Introduction 
Eastern Europe was once a region with a high standard of living, even in comparison to 
Western Europe. Van Zanden (1999) found that wages expressed as the purchasing 
power of grain were higher in the Polish cities of Warsaw and Krakow during the 16
th 
and early 17
th centuries (and in Lviv, which is in today’s West Ukraine, during the 16
th 
century) than in many Western European locations.
1 Using anthropometric indices, 
Koepke and Baten (2005, 2008) found Northern and Eastern European health and 
nutrition levels to have been more favorable than those of Western and Southern Europe. 
According to estimates in Koepke and Baten (2005, Table 3), during the 16
th century the 
average height of Eastern European men was 171.4 cm, compared to 170.4 cm among the 
British, 169.3 cm among the southern Germans, and 170.0 cm among the "North Rhine" 
(Dutch/West German) people.
2  
However, during the 19
th century, real wages as well as human capital (which is 
typically correlated with income), were clearly lower in Eastern Europe. Of course, the 
effects of economic changes, wars, and social transformations were considerable over 
such a long period. What happened? And what were the determinants of these economic 
changes? In an attempt to answer these and related questions, we will study the 
development of numeracy in this region. Numeracy is clearly a core component of human 
capital, especially in agricultural societies, in which decisions about the timing of 
activities had to take a number of issues into account, such as the weather, the status of 
                                                 
1 Of course, the cities for which evidence is available may not be representative for all of Eastern Europe. 
In fact, in our conclusion we will argue that western and central Poland, to which they refer, still had a 
remarkably high level of numeracy in the early 17
th century, which was different in other regions. 
2 During the 17th century, heights among Eastern European started to decline to a dramatic extent, 
however.   3
plants and animals, and other similar variables. We will therefore use the techniques for 
measuring age-heaping in order to compare numeracy in several Eastern and Central-
Eastern European regions with evidence from Western and Southern Europe. Although 
Poland belongs to Central-Eastern Europe, we will use the term Eastern Europe in the 
following for reasons of brevity. 
Our sources are: (1) the ‘lists of souls’ (either the Roman Catholic Libri Status 
Animarum or their Protestant Seelenregister equivalents; (2) censuses of the Civil 
Military Order Commissions 1790–1792 in the territories of Poland-Lithuania; (3) the 
Russian ‘revizii’ (tax-oriented censuses); (4) the censuses of 1897 in Russia and 1880 in 
Prussia and Austria-Hungary; and (5) other types of household listings, including 
‘communion books’ and local administrative surveys, as well as private and Crown estate 
inventories. 
These sources allow us to estimate numeracy in several regions of what is today 
Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania, and Russia. The application of age-heaping-based 
numeracy estimates to this newly available data set is performed here for the first time for 
such a large region and the time frame (but see Mironov 1991 and Kaiser and Peyton 
1993 on Russian samples). Given the regional character of our sources, we decided to 
aggregate the numeracy estimates using today’s national borders rather than historical 
empires or other regional units. This will allow for the comparison of the estimates with 
other historical evidence in the future (such as GDP estimates, anthropometric welfare, 
and other indicators). 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. We first review some findings 
and hypotheses of the previous literature regarding the reasons why Eastern Europe   4
lagged behind Western Europe in educational and welfare levels. In the second section, 
we present our new data set and explain its capabilities and limitations. In Section 3, we 
briefly explain the age-heaping methodology, as well as some caveats and doubts 
scholars may have about it. We also provide some of the responses to potential criticism 
of age-heaping proponents. In Section 4, we report the results at the regional level and 
present a method that can be used to adjust for regional biases. Finally, in Section 5, we 
present the national estimates for the five Eastern European countries since the 17
th 
century, and compare these estimates with evidence from Western and Southern Europe. 
Finally, we present a tentative discussion of the implications of our findings for our 
understanding of early modern economic growth. 
 
1. Review of the literature 
In his study of literacy rates around 1800, Reis (2005) reported substantially lower values 
for Hungary (six percent), which is the only Eastern (or Central-Eastern) country he 
documented. This value was substantially lower than in other European countries. A very 
long-run study on Russian literacy was performed by Mironov (1991). He cited the 
estimate by the Russian historian Sapunov that a mere one to 1.5 percent of the Russian 
population in the mid-13
th century may have been literate before the Mongol invasion 
(based on the assumption that monks, clergymen, and the upper strata of secular society 
were literate). Mironov reported that, by the end of the 17
th century, the number of books, 
records, and similar literacy-related items had increased. Literacy estimates based on the 
signatures of witnesses in legal sources yielded a very rough literacy rate of between two 
and 2.5 percent for the late 17
th century. Finally, by organizing the 1897 census (which   5
also reported literacy) by birth cohorts, he arrived at an estimate of four percent around 
1800 and 13 percent around 1850. Literacy might have been 30 percent around 1900. In 
contrast, the literacy rates in Western Europe were estimated at between 15 and 65 
percent in the early modern period until around 1800 (A’Hearn et al. 2009, p. 802). 
Mironov also looked at local samples of Baltic peasants and other sources to assess the 
degree of age-heaping, but did not organize the data by birth cohorts of adults. Kaiser and 
Peyton (1993), who studied the urban communities of Tula and Viatka around 1700, 
unearthed very important evidence, but also did not conduct a cohort analysis. A’Hearn et 
al. (2009) argued that Eastern Europe lagged behind the West in numeracy. 
What might have caused the relatively low Eastern European educational levels in 
the 19
th century, as well as the relatively modest welfare levels? A number of prominent 
explanations for the adverse development of Eastern Europe have been given in the 
previous literature.  
a) Hajnal famously argued that differences in the age at marriage and other 
aspects of household formation behavior differed between Eastern and Western Europe. 
He identified a border at the line St. Petersburg-Trieste, which might have left most of the 
Baltic and Western Poland in the ‘Western’ part; and Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and 
eastern Poland in the ‘Eastern’ part. It is possible that early marriage might have resulted 
in less educational investment per child. As early as in 1970, Hajnal’s observations had 
been rejected as being too simplistic by J. Sklar in her dissertation, and several other 
scholars have criticized them harshly in a number of more recent studies (Sklar 1970, 
Plakans and Wetherell 2005, Szołtysek 2004, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, Szołtysek and 
Zuber-Goldstein 2010). But despite this criticism, the Hajnal hypothesis remains a   6
persistent stereotype in economic history, as well as in demographic literature. Some of 
this discussion might be about the traditional dividing line between economists, who tend 
to accept simplifications and the statistical concept of the average; and family historians, 
who adhere to more nuanced and contextualized perspectives stressing micro- and meso-
level variation.  
But the East-West divide could also have been caused by other factors mentioned 
below. We should note upfront that the Hajnal hypothesis is considered here with very 
strong reservations. 
b) A lack of “girl power” (de Moor and van Zanden 2010, similarly Foreman-
Peck 2011) may have also played a role. De Moor and van Zanden have argued that in 
the West, and especially in the North Sea region, women had more customary rights in 
the labor market and in other aspects of family economies (such as inheritance; see, 
however, Guzowski 2010 and Dennison 2011 for criticism). Educational gender 
inequalities might have led to less education on average, as women were mainly 
responsible for basic education in the household. 
c) The second serfdom hypothesis is another classic in the economic history 
literature (Kula, 1976; Millward 1982; Cerman 2008; Ogilvie and Edwards 2000). In 
particular, historical Poland and Russia have been regarded as typical cases of noble 
landlordism and village subjection (Hagen, 1998; also Mironov, 1996).
3 The massive 
growth in landlord powers over the rural population in these areas was closely related to a 
rapid rise in agricultural commodity values in the West caused by the 16th-century ‘price 
                                                 
3 These were: juridical subjection, migration regulations, legal attachment to a particular social status, 
subjection to communal payments and duties (including the most harsh compulsory labour), limited right to 
private property, limited choice of occupation, and unprotected personal dignity; see Mironov, 1996, p. 
323.   7
revolution’. The Eastern European landowners responded to this trend by expanding their 
previously modest familial manor farms into large-scale domanial economies designed to 
produce surpluses for sale on the urban markets of Western Europe. This type of 
seigneurialism prompted landlords to demand from their peasant subjects not only rents 
in cash and kind, but above all labor services, which were essential to the very 
functioning of the demesne farms (Szołtysek 2008a). Serfs therefore had less incentive 
and ability to invest in basic education, such as the numeracy concept applied in this 
study. Of course, serfdom has taken on very different forms. The most extreme form was 
the manorial system based on peasants’ personal and hereditary subjection, as well as on 
their labor obligations (corvée) to the manors. This system was introduced in the 
territories of Poland-Lithuania during the 16
th to early 17th centuries; however, the 
strongest manorial system developed in western Poland and in some parts of Ukraine 
(esp. Volhynia). On the other hand, there have always been areas where this type of 
serfdom could never have been fully introduced (Polessia in Belarus; Subcarpathian 
Ukraine). For example, in wide areas of the historical Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a 
softened version of the system–based on cash quitrents rather than on corvée, or a 
mixture of the two—emerged in the second half of the 17
th century and prevailed until the 
end of the Polish republic in 1795 (Szołtysek 2008a, 2008b).  
As a minor digression from the literature review, we will look briefly at the 
regional distribution of serfs, as opposed to free or manumitted persons, and people on 
government-owned estates.  
An overwhelming majority of the population of all of the territories under 
investigation lived in personal and hereditary subjection up until the 19th-century   8
reforms, with their property rights limited to an indeterminate leasehold. This fact 
notwithstanding, it has been observed that the share of hereditary or emphyteutic 
freeholders, or peasants holding more advantageous property rights, diminished 
considerably and progressively when moving into Polish eastern territories and Russia 
(Rutkowski, 1986; Moon 1999). If we consider the distribution in the share of serfs in the 
Russian Empire during mid-19
th century, a clear regional pattern also emerges (Figure 
4).
4 Especially in a central corridor between Belarus (Minsk) and Nishniy Novgorod, the 
share of serfs was particularly large. In contrast, the thinly populated regions in the 
Northeast had few serfs, and the same is true for the Southeast. Moreover, the Southeast 
was characterized during the late serfdom period by the slightly less oppressive system of 
Barshchina, in which feudal obligations were paid in money or kind, whereas the corvée 
system of compulsory labor was more typical in other regions. The share of serfs actually 
corresponds quite well to the regional distribution of numeracy and literacy (Figure 2 and 
3). 
d) Large-farm agriculture is often associated with a political economy in which 
large landowners prevented tax-financed public schooling, as they saw no need for serfs 
to learn (and perhaps demand political rights) in schools financed by the taxes of the rich. 
Similar considerations apply to agricultural laborers later on, after the abolition of 
serfdom.
5 
e) Likewise, the political governance of the Russian Empire did not favor 
schooling, and the situation in eastern Russia was similar. The Russian Empire was 
                                                 
4 Note, however, that no data are provided for Polish territories. 
5 ‘Agricultural laborers’ were only part of socioeconomic landscape of Eastern Europe for the period after 
the formal abolition of serfdom; they emerged quite early in Galicia due to Josephinian reforms of 1780s, 
and then in the province of Greater Poland (Prussian Province of Posen) after the 1820s.   9
dominated by the landed interests of its nobility. Hence, investment in schooling was not 
very high on the national agenda, at until the empire lost the Crimean War. During this 
major event, not just the military inferiority of Russia, but also the empire’s 
backwardness in terms of productivity and human capital became obvious. Thereafter, 
the government implemented reforms which also initiated a trend towards investing in 
larger-scale schooling. 
f) The long-run consequences of wars and civil wars might have been a risk 
aversion among the population regarding investments of any sort. The terrible damage 
caused by the mid-17
th-century wars, soon repeated during the 1720s, brought the 
development of the manorial economy and the land-labor ratio to levels not very different 
to those of the late 17th century; i.e., at the beginning of the agrarian change (Szołtysek 
2008a). 
d) Lower life expectancy might have had the same effect. Life expectancy at birth, 
e0, was probably lower in this part of Europe than in the West, although our evidence for 
this assumption is still relatively weak. At least for historical Poland, this is only a 
tentative argument based on single case studies using different methodologies; it is 
widely believed that values of 27 for males and around 27-28 for women were typical in 
Eastern Europe in the late 18
th century, whereas some West European countries reached 
values above 30 (Kuklo 2009). 
h) Low population density and the lack of a transport system made commuting to 
schools more costly and returns on schooling lower; of course, this only refers to the 
statistical average, and to the East in particular. There were regions in historical Poland 
with quite substantial population densities, such as Lesser Poland around Krakow,   10
Galicia, or some regions close to the Baltic Sea under the Royal Prussia. The 17
th-century 
wars cut deep wounds in terms of population densities as well. The regions of western 
and central Poland, as well as of western Galicia, generally represented the most 
populated areas of the country. Moving to the eastern areas, we observe a gradual 
decrease in population density; in late 18
th-century Belarus, it was definitely below 10 
persons/km². 
i) Religion: Could the absence of Protestantism, or the lack of religious 
competition, have played a role (Baten and van Zanden 2008)? While most of Slavic 
Russia was Orthodox, the religious pattern was more mixed in the West. Calvinism 
emerged among the Polish nobility in the 16
th century and dominated this political class 
well into the mid-17
th century, or even longer; the western fringes of Poland were 
inhabited by religiously mixed communities, with a substantial share of Protestants 
(mainly settlers from different parts of Germany and the Netherlands). The degree of 
religious fractionalization was much lower in the Polish eastern ‘borderlands’ throughout 
the early modern period (Szady 2010, 228-250). Even there, however, religiously mixed 
communities or regions could be found, with the peasantry dominated by Uniates (and 
later members of the Orthodox faith), and not seldom intermingled with islets of Polish-
speaking minor nobility. There was also a substantial Jewish population. Similarly 
important in this context could be the competition between the Uniates and the Orthodox 
believers, on the one hand; and the Catholics and the Protestants on the other (Mitterauer 
2003). 
Some of these potential determinants will be discussed below using interregional 
comparisons, while others will be discussed using East-West comparisons. However, the   11
aim of the present paper is not to perform a regression in which these potential 
explanations are systematically tested against each other. 
 
2. Sources 
Our sources are: (1) the ‘lists of souls’ (either the Roman Catholic Libri Status Animarum 
or their Protestant Seelenregister equivalents; (2) the censuses of the Civil-Military Order 
Commissions 1790–1792 in the territories of Poland-Lithuania (which were occupied by 
the Russian Empire after the late 18
th century); (3) the Russian revizii (tax-oriented 
censuses); (4) the censuses of 1880 in Prussia and Austria-Hungary (which had occupied 
other territories of modern Poland) and 1897 in Russia; and (5) other types of household 
lists, including ‘communion books’ and local administrative surveys, as well as private 
and Crown estate inventories.
6 
In Table 1, we report on the places and regions for which evidence is available. In 
the second column, we list the country in which the regional unit is situated today. In the 
following three columns, we indicate the county, the larger district, and the empire in 
which these places were situated towards the later 19
th century. It should be noted that, of 
the places situated in Prussia or Austria-Hungary, we included only those with a large 
majority of Polish speakers. This was done to avoid placing German-speaking 
communities in the category of ‘today’s Poland’, as their descendants might later have 
                                                 
6 All these sources, except for 19th-century censuses and the 17th/18
th-century sources on Russia, are the 
part of the CEURFAMFORM Database developed by M. Szołtysek. The database development was 
supported by the Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship project (FP6-2002-Mobility-5, Proposal No. 
515065) at the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure, Cambridge, UK, 2006-
2008. More details in Szołtysek 2008a, 2008b. 
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fled or been moved to Germany after WWII. In the ethnic overlap between Poland, 
Lithuania, and Belarus, we have been less restrictive. There might be some migration 
biases later on. We also took care not to include any sources in which some cross-
checking by priests or officials might have taken place. In those cases, there was almost 
no heaping present. We only included county-birth decade averages that were based on at 
least 50 observations (for the number of cases, see an appendix available from the 
authors). 
 
3. Assessing human capital formation with the age-heaping indicator and other 
measures of human capital 
Measuring the production factor ‘human capital’ has never been simple, as advanced 
forms of skills are difficult to compare. All economists have therefore resorted to the use 
of proxy indicators, such as the share of people signing a marriage register. Grundlach 
(2001) noted that the empirical measurement of the human capital factor and the 
productivity of education in economic growth performed in human capital research up to 
this point are still not completely satisfying. A comparison of different proxy indicators 
might perhaps be the best option for obtaining reliable insights. This is the rationale for 
using the age-heaping methodology (as well as comparisons of literacy and schooling, 
wherever they are available to us). We will explain the advantages and caveats in 
somewhat greater detail, as the application of this method in economic history is still 
relatively new.  
This approach employs the set of methods that developed around the phenomenon 
of ‘age-heaping’; i.e., the tendency of poorly educated people to round their age   13
erroneously. For example, less educated people are more likely than people with a greater 
endowment of human capital to state their age as “30,” even if they are in fact 29 or 31 
years old (Mokyr 1985).
7 Crayen and Baten (2008) found that the relationship between 
illiteracy and age heaping for LDCs after 1950 is very close. They calculated age-heaping 
and illiteracy for not less than 270,000 individuals who were organized by 416 regions, 
ranging from Latin America to Oceania. The correlation coefficient with illiteracy was as 
high as 0.7. The correlation with the PISA results for numerical skills was as high as 
0.85; hence, the age-heaping measure “Whipple Index” is more strongly correlated with 
numerical skills. A’Hearn, Baten, and Crayen (2009) used a large U.S. census sample to 
perform a very detailed analysis of this relationship. They subdivided the sample by race, 
gender, high and low educational status, and other criteria. In each case, they obtained a 
statistically significant relationship. It is also remarkable that the coefficients are 
relatively stable between samples; i.e., a unit change in age heaping is associated with 
similar changes in literacy across the various tests. Those results are not only valid for the 
U.S.: in all of the countries studied so far that had substantial age-heaping, the correlation 
was found to be both statistically and economically significant.
8 
In order to assess the robustness of those U.S. census results and the similar 
conclusions which could be drawn from the less developed countries of the late 20th 
century, as mentioned in the introduction to this study, A’Hearn et al. (2009) also 
assessed age-heaping and literacy in 16 different European countries between the middle 
ages and the early 19th century. Again, they found a positive correlation between age 
                                                 
7 Among demographers, this specific type of age misreporting constitutes “one of most frustrating 
problems” (Ewbank 1981, 88). It is treated as a source of distortion in age-specific vital rates which needs 
to be removed, or at least minimized in order to study the family or household variables.  
8 On the regions of Argentina, see, for example, Manzel, Baten, and Stolz (forthcoming).   14
heaping and literacy, although the relationship was somewhat weaker than for the 19th- 
or 20th-century data. It is likely that the unavoidable measurement error when using early 
modern data induced the lower statistical significance.
9  
The possibly widest geographical sample studied so far has been created by 
Crayen and Baten (2010), who were able to include 70 countries for which both age-
heaping and schooling data (as well as other explanatory variables) were available. They 
found in a series of cross-sections between the 1880s and 1940s that primary schooling 
and age-heaping were closely correlated, with R-squares between 0.55 and 0.76 
(including other control variables, see below). Again, the coefficients were shown to be 
relatively stable over time. This large sample also allowed for the examination of various 
other potential determinants of age-heaping. To assess whether the degree of 
bureaucracy, birth registration, and government interaction with citizens is likely to 
influence the knowledge of one’s exact age, independent of personal education, Crayen 
and Baten used the number of censuses performed for each individual country up to the 
period under study as an explanatory variable for their age-heaping measure. Except for 
countries with a very long history of census taking, all of the variations of this variable 
turned out to be insignificant, which would suggest that such an independent bureaucracy 
effect was rather weak. In other words, it appears to be the case that societies with a high 
number of censuses and an early introduction of birth registers had a high degree of age 
awareness. But those societies also introduced schooling early, and this was the variable 
                                                 
9 The experience of historical demographers shows that data from premodern times were often very rough, 
imprecise, or fragmentary. Even the18th century statistical materials are still a sheer jungle of uncertainties 
and traps, as they were not seldom collected haphazardly and analyzed without sill; as a result, they often 
embrace just part of the phenomenon which they refer to, are thus incomplete (Szołtysek 2011). This refers 
in particular to the quality of data on age.    15
that clearly had more explanatory power than the independent bureaucracy effect. Crayen 
and Baten also tested whether the general standard of living had an influence on age-
heaping tendencies (using height as well as GDP per capita as welfare indicators), and 
found a varying influence: in some decades, there was a statistically significant 
correlation, while in others there was none.  
Was this correlation between numeracy and literacy also visible in Eastern 
Europe? When comparing the log literacy in the Russian Imperial census of 1897 for the 
individuals born between 1825 and 1884 on the vertical axis, and their numeracy levels 
(see Figure 3, expressed by the ABCC index) on the horizontal axis, we can see that there 
is a clear correlation. The Baltic governments of Estland and Livland, as well as the 
capital region of St. Petersburg, featured very positively, whereas the ‘serfdom’-intensive 
regions around Belarus had quite low values of both literacy and numeracy.
10 
Interestingly, the northeastern districts of European Russia—such as Archangelsk, 
Wologda, and Perm—were much better in numeracy than they were in literacy. The 
previous literature has noted that, for literacy development, the existence of schools is 
even more important than for basic numeracy. For the latter, education in the family 
contributes more in relative terms. In the thinly populated regions of the northeast, 
gaining access to schools was much more difficult than in the more densely populated 
areas farther south. 
In conclusion, the correlation between age-heaping and other human capital 
indicators is quite well established, and the ‘bureaucratic’ factor does not invalidate this 
relationship. A caveat relates to other forms of heaping (apart from the heaping on 
                                                 
10 Please note that, as serfdom was abolished on all these territories in 1864, a potential impact must have 
stemmed from the first four decades. An outlier is the district of Kowno.   16
multiples of five), such as heaping on multiples of two, which is quite widespread among 
children and teenagers and to a lesser extent among young adults in their twenties.
11 This 
shows that most individuals knew their age as teenagers, but that only in well-educated 
societies were they are able to remember or calculate their exact age later in life. At 
higher ages, this heaping pattern was mostly negligible, but it was, interestingly, 
somewhat stronger among populations who were numerate enough not to round on 
multiples of five. We will exclude those below age 23 and above 72 since a number of 
possible distortions affect those specific age groups, leading to age reporting behavior 
different from that of the adult group in between. Many young males and females married 
in their early twenties or late teens, when they also had to register as voters, military 
conscripts, etc. On such occasions, they were sometimes subject to minimum age 
requirements, a condition which gave rise to increased age awareness. Moreover, 
individuals in this age group were physically growing, which makes it easier to determine 
their age with a relatively high accuracy. All of these factors tend to deflate age-heaping 
levels for children and young adults, compared with the age reporting of the same 
individuals at higher ages. Because the age-heaping pattern of very old individuals is 
subject to upward as well as downward bias for the reasons mentioned above, the very 
old should also be excluded.  
There remains some uncertainty about whether age-heaping in the sources 
contains information about the numeracy of the responding individual, or rather about the 
diligence of the reporting personnel who wrote down the statements. The age data of the 
                                                 
11 It has been shown that, in some societies, in addition to the usual overrepresentation of five and zero, 
there was also a decided preference for figures ending on other digits, whereas avoidance of some numbers 
was likely to occur in a patterned way as well (Stockwell 1966; Nagi, Stockwell and Snavley 1973).   17
relevant age groups of 23-72 were normally derived from statements from the person 
himself or herself. However, it is possible that a second party, especially the husband, 
may have made or influenced the age statement, or even that the enumerator estimated 
the age without asking the individual. If the latter occurred, we would not be able to 
measure the numeracy of the person interviewed. In contrast, if the enumerator asked and 
obtained no response, a round age estimated by him would still measure basic numeracy 
correctly. A large body of literature has investigated the issue of other persons reporting. 
Foldvari et al. (2011) speculated, for example, that wives may appear to have been more 
numerate than they actually were because they improved their age statement with the 
help of their husbands. They compared the numeracy of married and unmarried women 
and found that the latter had significantly lower numeracy in some of their samples. 
However, de Moor (2011) recently rejected this view with a number of good arguments. 
Moreover, in the early modern period and the 19
th century, marriage was often associated 
with higher educational and social status, as a number of studies have found (for 
example, Baten and Murray 1998). We compared male and female numeracy in our 
sample, and found that women were sometimes more numerate than men, which would 
support the hypothesis that they reported their age themselves. On the other hand, there is 
a correlation between the male and female numeracy of different households. Recently, 
Friesen et al. (2011) compared systematically the evidence of a gender gap in numeracy 
and in literacy for the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries, and found a strong correlation. 
They argued that there is no reason why the misreporting of literacy and age should have 
yielded exactly the same gap between genders. A more likely explanation is that the well-
known correlation between numeracy and literacy also applies to gender differences. For   18
our study, the question of whether the women answered themselves is slightly less 
important, because we only seek to estimate average numeracy. 
Moreover, there is sometimes direct evidence in the sources that the wives 
themselves were asked. Manzel et al. (2011) reported finding sources on Latin American 
Indio women in which statements like this one were included: “She says that she is 30, 
but she looks more like 40.” Even for black female and male slaves in the Cape Colony in 
South Africa who were accused of crimes, the legal personnel created a separate column 
that indicated whether the person was guessing her age, or whether she actually knew. It 
is possible that, if those Indio and African women, who probably were not shown much 
respect by colonial officers, were asked for their age; then European women might also 
have been asked for their age, as the level respect shown to them might have been 
somewhat greater. 
The problem of different enumerators influencing the quality of age statements 
has also been studied in a 20
th-century context. While a large part of age misreporting 
indeed arises because the respondents do not know their exact age, this problem is likely 
to be exacerbated by differences in the quality of the performance of the enumerators, as 
some of them may have taken their duties more seriously than others (United Nations 
1952, 59). Referring to the notorious hardships encountered in the surveying processes in 
contemporary developing countries, Ewbank observed: “In particular, the training of 
interviewers, their level of education, and their ability to understand and pursue the 
interests of the researcher will significantly affect the quality of data [on age]” (Ewbank 
1981, 15). However, the difference between the behavior of 20
th-century enumerators and 
the priests and officials of the 17
th to 19
th century is that the former had much easier   19
access to sources that would enable them to cross-check age statements. Priests of the 
18
th century could have looked up birth years in birth registers, but because the registers 
were usually chronologically sorted, the cross-checking of ages would have required a 
substantial investment of time. Still, some of the existing sources were clearly cross-
checked (yielding ABCC values of around 100 very early), and hence we used a 
historian’s judgment in excluding them. In addition, Szołtysek (2011) found that 
differences in the age-heaping patterns in historical Poland-Lithuania might be partly 
amenable to explanation by referring to different organizing principles of the 
enumeration process inherent to different types of listings.  
Of course, a potential bias always exists if more than one person is involved in the 
creation of a historical source. For example, if literacy is measured by analyzing the share 
of signatures in marriage contracts, there might have been priests who were more or less 
interested in obtaining real signatures, as opposed to just crosses or other symbols. We 
find it reinforcing that previous studies have generally found much more age-heaping 
(and less numeracy) among the lower social strata, and among the half of the sample 
population who had lower anthropometric values (Baten and Mumme 2010). Moreover, 
the regional differences of age-heaping are similar to the regional differences in illiteracy. 
It can be concluded that the method of age-heaping is a useful and innovative tool for 
assessing human capital. 
 
4. Results at the regional level and the adjustment of regional biases   20
We present the ABCC estimates for the individual regions in Table A.1 in the 
appendix.
12 On the left side of Table A.1, the new regional estimates for the period of the 
1630s to 1810s are presented; while on the right side, the 1820s to 1900s estimates are 
given. The latter are based on the 1880 and 1897 population census and later censuses, 
while the former set of figures is based on the sources mentioned in the data section. For 
Russia, five regions can be documented, sometimes for very different periods. To what 
degree are those regions representative? The fact that Moscow is included in the five 
documented regions suggests that there is probably upward bias. Hence the next logical 
question would be: Did the regions have ABCC values similar to the average of Russia in 
the 1897 census? Or, how large was the upward bias? In fact, four out of the five regions 
had ABCC values 15-25 percent above the Russian average (Column “Adjustment 
factor”). Only the Eyskij location in the Kuban territories south of Rostov/Don was 
similar to the Russian average for the birth decade of the 1820s. Hence, we need a 
regional adjustment. For simplicity, we take the difference for the birth cohort of the 
1820s, and report the regionally adjusted values in Table A.2 in the appendix. This 
adjustment is based on the assumption that the interregional bias was similar in the early 
period and for the birth decade of the 1820s. This might not have been the case for all of 
the regions, but in general the estimate will be closer to the true national average after the 
adjustment than before. The fact that we normally have four to five different regional 
                                                 
12 The ABCC Index reports a society’s share of individuals who probably know their true age (named after 
A’Hearn, Baten and Crayen, as well as Greg Clark, who developed that measure). The formula is  
 
The index ranges from 0 to 100. If everybody reports the correct age, ABCC has a value of 100. 
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data sets to compare allows us to gain an impression of the size of measurement error 
implied by this procedure. For example, in the case of Przemyshlany and the birth decade 
of the 1730s, the resulting value is clearly too low; also, the Warsaw region might have 
been underestimated for the 18
th century. But in the vast majority of cases, the regional 
adjustment procedure works relatively well. In order to remain consistent, we take all of 
the values into account. 
 
5 Estimates for the five Eastern European countries and international comparison 
In a next step, we generate national estimates based on those regional values. In Figure 5, 
we display the regional and national estimates for Russia. Some of the early estimates are 
above and others are below the estimate for Russia, but the emerging trend seems 
relatively clear. Hence we show the national trends for all five countries in Figure 6. We 
distinguish between the western and eastern parts of today’s Poland. The western part is 
made up of East Silesia and other parts of Prussia (only Polish speakers), as well as of 
those districts that were annexed by Prussia and Austria-Hungary in the 18
th-century 
partitions of Poland. The eastern part consists of the regions that were occupied by the 
Russian Empire. We were curious about whether the west and east would yield similar 
estimates for the whole of Poland after being regionally adjusted to the national mean. In 
fact, the similarity of level suggests that this division does not affect the estimates for 
Poland significantly, even if the variation over time is not identical. 
Finally, our aim was to make those series graphically comparable with estimates 
for other European regions. This was achieved by using the LOWESS procedure, which   22
was previously used by Manzel et al. (2011). In order to make the comparison, the 
eastern and western parts of Poland were considered together (Figure 7). 
 
Eastern Europe in international comparison 
What broad trends do we obtain from this procedure, and how do they compare with 
those of other European regions? In Figure 8, data from Eastern Europe were plotted 
against the evidence from Western and Southern European countries, which we derived 
from Stolz et al. 2012 (see also Tollnek and Baten 2011). The authors assessed the 
Northwestern European region (Austria, Germany, France, Sweden, and the UK), for 
which relatively continuous evidence from the 1730s is available, and the Southern 
European region (Italy, Spain, Portugal). Both series start at around 80 percent numeracy 
in the early 18
th century, but the Northwestern region made more rapid progress, and 
achieved 95 percent numeracy around 1800. The Northwest had solved the basic 
numeracy problem by around the middle of the 19
th century. Numeracy in Southern 
Europe stagnated at a quite high level of around 82 percent from the 1730s until the 
1820s, and then slowly converged with Northwestern European levels. Earlier evidence 
suggests that, during the 15
th century, numeracy levels varied across Europe from 72 
percent ABCC in the Netherlands, to 55 percent in Northern Italy, to 40 percent in 
Germany, and down to 18 percent in Southern Italy (A’Hearn et al. 2009). Juif and Baten 
(2011) found that Spain and Portugal had numeracy levels of around 60 percent both in 
the early and the late 17
th century. 
Hence, the Northwestern and Southern European regions were clearly more 
numerate than all of the Eastern European regions we are assessing here during the 18
th   23
and 19
th centuries, although during the 17
th century Poland did not differ very much from 
the European South (Juif and Baten 2011). Moreover, the trends of convergence and the 
slowdown in the individual regions are interesting. Russia started at a much lower level 
than Portugal, or at around 20 percent in the early 17
th century, but the gap between 
Russia and Poland had declined to less than five percent in the mid-18
th century. During 
the 19
th century, human capital again started to accumulate, and the problem of basic 
numeracy was almost solved around 1900.  
Poland displayed stagnant levels of numeracy throughout much of the 17
th and 
early 18
th centuries (around 60), whereas the European South grew by some 20 ABCC 
points during this period. Basic trends in numeracy continued to increase in Poland 
during the middle decades of the 18
th century. During the 19
th century, a steady upward 
trend can be discerned in all of the Eastern European regions.  
Among the countries studied here, Belarus, Lithuania, and Ukraine lagged behind 
the most. During the early to mid-18
th century, numeracy still stood at around 20 percent 
in Lithuania, 40 percent in Belarus, and 50 percent in Ukraine. Ukraine then started a 
rapid development, which resulted in Ukrainian numeracy levels overtaking Russian 
levels during the 19
th century. It would be interesting to assess whether the migration of 
Jewish people from the Polish-Lithuanian regions to Ukraine also stimulated this surge in 
Ukrainian numeracy. Belarus and Lithuania experienced the most rapid growth in their 
numeracy levels during the 19
th century.  
The relatively large discrepancy between Polish and Russian levels early on, and 
the much greater dissimilarity of the former in relation to the territories of Belarus, 
Lithuania, and Ukraine during the 18
th century, are among the major findings here.   24
 
Results and Conclusion 
Serfdom seems to have played a key role in limiting human capital development in 
Eastern Europe, as is apparent in the regional patterns we discussed in the digression 
from the literature review. The earliest evidence we have on western Poland suggests 
that, in the early 17
th century, the region was not very far behind other regions of Europe. 
For example, it displayed a numeracy level similar to those of Portugal and Spain in 
1600-49 and 1650-99 (Juif and Baten 2011). By contrast, Russia was probably at a much 
lower level during this period, whereas Belarus, Ukraine, and Lithuania started at very 
low levels when our evidence becomes available in the 18
th century. The fact that western 
Poland was still doing relatively well during the early 17
th century, but was not able to 
converge to Western European levels during the 17
th,18
th and early 19
th centuries, and 
even fell back relative to Southern Europe during this period, might support a second 
serfdom hypothesis. 
In addition to being impeded by wars, which also affected other regions of 
Europe, such as Central and Southern Europe; educational progress in Eastern Europe 
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today County  1880/1897 
Adm. Gouv./Province 
1880/1897 Empire 
Bobrujski by  Bobrujskij  Minskaja  Poland/Russia
Lelowski pl  Chenstohovskij  Petrokovskaja Poland/Russia








Hauptmannschaft)  Galizien 
Austria-
Hungary 
Olsztynski pl  Ermland-Masuren    Koenigsberg  Prussia 
Mozyrski by  Gomel'skij  Mogilevskaja  Russia 
Koscian  pl  County in Greater Poland  Posen  Prussia 
Kaliski pl  Kaliskij  Kaliskaja  Poland/Russia
Kruszwicki pl  Kaliskij  Kaliskaja Poland/Russia
Ostrzeszowski pl  Kaliskij Kaliskaja  Poland/Russia






Radziejowski  pl  County in Greater Poland   Posen  Prussia 
Sepólno  pl  County in Greater Poland   Posen  Prussia 






Leczycki pl  Lodzinskij  Petrokovskaja Poland/Russia
Krasnystaw ua  Lublinskij  (East)  Lublinskaja  Poland/Russia
Minski by Minskij  Minskaja  Poland/Russia
Nieswieski by  Minskij  Minskaja  Poland/Russia
Nowogrodzki by  Minskij  Minskaja  Poland/Russia
Slucki by  Minskij  Minskaja  Poland/Russia
Wilejka by  Minskij  Minskaja  Poland/Russia
Bytomski pl  Opole  Opole  Prussia 
Siewierski pl  Opole  Opole  Prussia 
Dawidgrodecki by  Pinskij  Minskaja  Poland/Russia






Wilenski lt  Vilenskij  Vilenskaja  Poland/Russia
Kcynski pl  Warschavskij  Warschavskaja  Poland/Russia
Eyskij ru Eyskij  Kuban  territory  Russia 
Moskovskij ru  Moskovskij  Moskovskij  Russia 
Orenburgskij ru  Orenburgskij  Orenburgskij  Russia 
Tulskij ru Tulskij  Tulskij  Russia 
Vjatskij ru  Vjatskij  Vjatskij  Russia 
   31
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Note: It refers to individuals born between 1825 and 1874. The black value of Kovno is 
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Note: It refers to individuals born between 1825 and 1884.    33
Figure 4: Serfdom in the Russian Empire 
 
 
Source: Lyashchenko (1949)   34
Figure 5: Regionally adjusted numeracy (ABCC) of places in Russia 
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Figure 8: Eastern European ABCC estimates in comparison 
 
Sources for NW and S Europe: Stolz et al. (2012), see also Tollnek and Baten (2011); 
Southern Europe in 1630 (1680) refers to the average value of Spain and Portugal during 
the period 1600-49 (1650-99), see Juif and Baten (2001). 
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Table A.1: ABCC by region (raw values), and regional adjustment factors 




Russia                               
Eyskij              62  73  79  78     65  72  80  87  88      1 
Moskovskij     66  68  69              83  84  88  93  96      19 
Orenburgskij                   90   87  80  75  81  84      23 
Tulskij   45  48  59  61  57  51              87  81  81  87  92      23 
Vjatskij   26  35  32  33  38               78  80  85  90  90      14 
Russia                                                           64  69  77  84  86  90  93  95  98    
Poland-East (later Russian)                           
Chenstohovskij           66  60  73  74       76  78  78  89  88      -1 
Kaliskij           76  77  72  71  88       74  77  77  90  87      -3 
Warschavskij         57  41  50  67         91  90  91  96  98      14 
Poland-East                                                           77  78  80  86  87  88  92  94  97    
Poland-West (19th C Austria/Prussia)                         
Ermland-
Masuren  62  49  84  83                98  88  89  90  95  91      11 
Cracow_County          34  62  75  75  81      92  97  95  100  98       20 
Posen           66  71  82  83  86      92  92  93  95  97       15 
Oppeln             83  93  97      93  93  93  95  98       16 
Pomerania        83  77  85  87  93        98  97  98  98  98       20 
Poland-West (19th C Austria/Prussia)                                            77  78  80  86  87  88  92  94  97    
Belarus                               
Bobrujskij           24  34  37  35  28       48  54  63  75  81      -2 
Gomelskij           42  41  48  51  45       50  59  70  82  84      0 
Minskij           43  34  37  40  34       55  60  66  77  81      5 
Pinskij           38  50  51  54  48       57  62  68  80  80      7 
Belarus                             34  37  41  42  36                 50  55  63  75  82  84  90  92  96    
Lithuania                               
Vilenskij             31  33  35  26      69  68  71  82  87      10 
Lithuania                                                           59  61  62  74  86  89  92  94  97    
Ukraine                               
Charkovskij          42  44  53  60  67    84     67  72  79  87  91      1 
Kossow                60  73  94   98  97  96  96  97       31 
Krasnystaw           83  85  84  86        79  80  81  91  92      13 
Przemyshlany           28  41  51       90  92  97  93  92       26   41
Ukraine                                                           66  72  78  85  87  91  94  95  98      42
Table A.2: ABCC by region (regionally adjusted values) 
 
Region  1630 1640 1650 1660 1670 1680 1690 1700 1710 1720 1730 1740 1750 1760 1770 1780 1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 
Russia                              
E y   s k i j 6 1 7 1 7 8 7 6
k i j 4 8 4 9 5 0
k i j 1 3 2 1 1 9 2 0 2 5
                              
M o s k o v s                                 
Orenburgskij                   67            
Tulskij   23  25  37  38  34  28                       
V j a t s                                 
Russia      18 23 28 35 36 39                     61 71 78 76     67     64 69 77 84 86 90 93 95 98 
Poland-East (later Russian)                          
Chenstohovskij 
s k i j
         67  60  74  75                
K a l i            7 9 8 0 7 4 7 3 9 0
k i j 4 3 2 7 3 6 5 2
                    
W a r s c h a v s                                
Poland-East                          43  53  61  62  74  83                 77  78  80  86  87  88  92  94  97 
Poland-West (19th C Austria/Prussia)                        
Ermland-
M a s u r   e n 5 1 3 8 7 3 7 2
5 1 5 6 6 7 6 8 7 1
                             
Cracow_County 
e n
        14  42  55  55  61                
P o s                                 
Oppeln             67  77  81                
Pomerania         63  57  65  67  73                  
Poland-West  51 38 73 72             63 57 44 55 66 67 71                     77 78 80 86 87 88 92 94 97 
Belarus                              
B o b r u j s   k i j 2 6 3 6 3 9 3 7 3 0
k i j 4 2 4 1 4 8 5 1 4 5
3 8 2 9 3 2 3 5 2 9
k i j 3 1 4 3 4 4 4 7 4 1
                              
G o m e l s  
s k i j
                              
M i n  
s
                              
P i n                                 
Belarus                             34  37  41  42  36                 50  55  63  75  82  84  90  92  96 
Lithuania                              
V i l e n   s k i j 2 1 2 3 2 5 1 6                               
Lithuania                                   21  23  25  16              59  61  62  74  86  89  92  94  97 
Ukraine                              
Charkovskij 
o w
        41  43  52  58  66    71              
K o s s                 2 9 4 2 6 3
a w 7 0 7 2 7 1 7 3
n y 1 1 4 2 5
               
K r a s n y s t                                
P r z e m y s h l a                                 
Ukraine                                  41 57 42 48 55     29 56 63         66 72 78 85 87 91 94 95 98 
 